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Abstract. Recently, machine learning (ML) has introduced advanced
solutions to many domains. Since ML models provide business advan-
tage to model owners, protecting intellectual property of ML models
has emerged as an important consideration. Confidentiality of ML mod-
els can be protected by exposing them to clients only via prediction
APIs. However, model extraction attacks can steal the functionality of
ML models using the information leaked to clients through the results
returned via the API. In this work, we question whether model extrac-
tion is a serious threat to complex, real-life ML models. We evaluate the
current state-of-the-art model extraction attack (Knockoff nets) against
complex models. We reproduce and confirm the results in the original pa-
per. But we also show that the performance of this attack can be limited
by several factors, including ML model architecture and the granularity
of API response. Furthermore, we introduce a defense based on distin-
guishing queries used for Knockoff nets from benign queries. Despite the
limitations of the Knockoff nets, we show that a more realistic adversary
can effectively steal complex ML models and evade known defenses.
Keywords: Machine Learning · Model extraction · Deep Neural Net-
works
1 Introduction
In recent years, machine learning (ML) has been applied to many areas with im-
pressive results. Use of ML models is now ubiquitous. Major enterprises (Google,
Apple, Facebook) utilize them in their products [29]. Companies gain busi-
ness advantage by collecting proprietary data and training high quality models.
Hence, protecting the intellectual property embodied in ML models is necessary
to preserve the business advantage of model owners.
Increased adoption of ML models and popularity of centrally hosted ser-
vices led to the emergence of Prediction-As-a-Service platforms. Rather than
distributing ML models to users, it is easier to run them on centralized servers
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having powerful computational resources and to expose them via prediction
APIs. Prediction APIs are used to protect the confidentiality of ML models and
allow for widespread availability of ML-based services that require users only to
have an internet connection. Even though users only have access to a prediction
API, each response necessarily leaks some information about the model. A model
extraction attack [31] is one where an adversary (a malicious client) extracts in-
formation from a victim model by frequently querying the model’s prediction
API. Queries and API responses are used to build a surrogate model with com-
parable functionality and effectiveness. Deploying surrogate models deprive the
model owner of its business advantage. Many extraction attacks are effective
against simple ML models [24,9] and defenses have been proposed against these
simple attacks [18,25]. However, extraction of complex ML models has got little
attention to date. Whether model extraction is a serious and realistic threat to
real-life systems remains an open question.
Recently, a novel model extraction attack Knockoff nets [22] has been pro-
posed against complex deep neural networks (DNNs). The paper reported em-
pirical evaluations showing that Knockoff nets is effective at stealing any image
classification model. This attack assumes that the adversary has access to (a)
pre-trained image classification models that are used as the basis for construct-
ing the surrogate model, (b) unlimited natural samples that are not drawn from
the same distribution as the training data of the victim model and (c) the full
probability vector as the output of the prediction API. Knockoff nets does not
require the adversary to have any knowledge about the victim model, training
data or its classification task (class semantics). Although other and more recent
model extraction attacks have been proposed [3,19,8], Knockoff nets remains
the most effective one against complex DNN models with the weakest adversary
model. Moreover, there is no detection mechanism specifically tailored against
model extraction attacks leveraging unlabeled natural data. Therefore, the nat-
ural question is whether Knockoff nets is a realistic threat through extensive
evaluation.
Goals and contributions. Our goals are twofold in this paper. First, we want
to understand the conditions under which Knockoff nets constitutes a realistic
threat. Hence, we empirically evaluate the attack under different adversary mod-
els. Second, we want to explore whether and under which conditions Knockoff
nets can be mitigated or detected. We claim the following contributions:
– reproduce the empirical evaluation of Knockoff nets under its original ad-
versary model to confirm that it can extract surrogate models exhibiting
reasonable accuracy (53.5-94.8%) for all five complex victim DNN models
we built (Sect. 3.2).
– introduce a defense, within the same adversary model, to detect Knockoff
nets by differentiating in- and out-of-distribution queries (attacker’s queries).
This defense correctly detects up to 99% of adversarial queries (Sect. 4).
– revisit the original adversary model to investigate how the attack effective-
ness changes with more realistic adversaries and victims (Section 5.1). The
attack effectiveness deteriorates when
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• the adversary uses a model architecture for the surrogate that is different
from that of the victim.
• the granularity of the victim’s prediction API output is reduced (return-
ing predicted class instead of a probability vector).
• the diversity of adversary queries is reduced.
On the other hand, the attack effectiveness can increase when the adver-
sary has access to natural samples drawn from the same distribution as the
victim’s training data. In this case, all existing attack detection techniques,
including our own, are no longer applicable (Section 5.4).
2 Background
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
A DNN is a function F : Rn → Rm, where n is the number of input features and
m is the number of output classes in a classification task. F (x) gives a vector of
length m containing probabilities pj that input x belongs to each class cj ∈ C
for j ∈ {1,m}. The predicted class, denoted Fˆ (x), is obtained by applying the
argmax function: Fˆ (x) = argmax(F (x)). Fˆ (x) tries to approximate a perfect
oracle function Of : Rn → C which gives the true class c for any input x ∈ Rn.
The test accuracy Acc(F ) expresses the degree to which F approximates Of .
2.2 Model Extraction Attacks
In a model extraction attack, the goal of an adversary A is to build a surrogate
model FA that imitates the model FV of a victim V. A wants to find an FA
having Acc(FA) as close as possible to Acc(FV) on a test set. A builds its own
dataset DA and implements the attack by sending queries to the prediction API
of FV and obtaining predictions FV(x) for each query x, where ∀x ∈ DA. A uses
the transfer set {DA, FV(DA)} to train a surrogate model FA.
According to prior work on model extraction [24,9], we can divide A’s ca-
pabilities into three categories: victim model knowledge, data access, querying
strategy.
Victim model knowledge. Model extraction attacks operate in a black-box
setting. A does not have access to model parameters of FV but can query the
prediction API without any limitation on the number of queries. A might know
the exact architecture of FV , its hyperparameters or its training process. Given
the purpose of the API (e.g., image recognition) and expected complexity of
the task, A may attempt to guess the architecture of FV [24]. FV ’s prediction
API may return one of the following: the probability vector, top-k labels with
confidence scores or only the predicted class.
Data access. Possible capabilities of A for data access vary in different model
extraction attacks. A can have access to a small subset of natural samples from
V’s training dataset [24,9]. A may not have access to V’s training dataset DV
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but may know the “domain” of data and have access to natural samples that
are close to V’s training data distribution (e.g., images of dogs in the task of
identifying dog breeds) [3]. A can use widely available natural samples that are
different from V’s training data distribution [22]. Finally, A can construct DA
with only synthetically crafted samples [31].
Querying strategy. Querying is the process of submitting a sample to the
prediction API. If A relies on synthetic data, it crafts samples that would help
it train FA iteratively. Otherwise, A first collects its samples DA, queries the
prediction API with the complete DA, and then trains the surrogate model with
{DA, FV(DA)}.
3 Knockoff Nets Model Extraction Attack
In this section, we study the Knockoff nets model extraction attack [22] which
achieves state-of-the-art performance against complex DNN models. Knockoff
nets works without access to V’s training data distribution, model architecture
and classification task.
3.1 Attack Description
Adversary model. The goal of A is model functionality stealing [22]: A wants
to train a surrogate model FA that performs similarly on a classification task
for which prediction API’s FV was designed. A has no information about FV
including model architecture, internal parameters and hyperparameters. More-
over, A does not have access to V’s training data, prediction API’s purpose or
output class semantics. A is a weaker adversary than previous work in [24,9]
due to these assumptions. However, A can collect an unlimited amount of varied
real-world data from online databases and can query prediction API without any
constraint on the number of queries. API always returns a complete probability
vector as an output for each legitimate query. A is not constrained in memory
and computational capabilities and uses publicly available pre-trained complex
DNN models as a basis for FA [13].
Attack strategy. A first collects natural data from online databases for con-
structing unlabeled dataset DA. For each query x, ∀x ∈ DA, A obtains a com-
plete probability vector FV(x) from the prediction API. A uses this transfer set
{DA, FV(DA)} to repurpose learned features of a complex pre-trained model
with transfer learning [14]. In the Knockoff nets setting, V offers image classifi-
cation and A constructs DA by sampling a subset of the ImageNet dataset [4].
3.2 Knockoff Nets: Evaluation
We first implement Knockoff nets under the original adversary model explained
in Section 3.1. We use the datasets and experimental setup described in [22]
for constructing both FV and FA . We also evaluate two additional datasets to
contrast our results with previous work.
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Datasets. We use Caltech [5], CUBS [32] and Diabetic Retinopathy (Dia-
betic5) [10] datasets as in [22] for training FV ’s and reproduce experiments
where Knockoff nets was successful. Caltech is composed of various images be-
longing to 256 different categories. CUBS contains images of 200 bird species
and is used for fine-grained image classification tasks. Diabetic5 contains high-
resolution retina images labeled with five different classes indicating the presence
of diabetic retinopathy. We augment Diabetic5 using preprocessing techniques
recommended in 4 to address the class imbalance problem. For constructing DA,
we use a subset of ImageNet, which contains 1.2M images belonging to 1000 dif-
ferent categories. DA includes randomly sampled 100,000 images from Imagenet,
100 images per class. 42% of labels in Caltech and 1% in CUBS are also present
in ImageNet. There is no overlap between Diabetic5 and ImageNet labels.
Additionally, we use CIFAR10 [15], depicting animals and vehicles divided
into 10 classes, and GTSRB [27], a traffic sign dataset with 43 classes. CIFAR10
contains broad, high level classes while GTSRB contains domain specific and
detailed classes. These datasets do not overlap with ImageNet labels and they
were partly used in prior model extraction work [24,9]. We resize images with
bilinear interpolation, where applicable.
All datasets are divided into training and test sets and summarized in Table 1.
All images in both training and test sets are normalized with mean and standard
deviation statistics specific to ImageNet.
Table 1. Image datasets used to evaluate Knockoff nets. GTSRB and CIFAR10 are
resized with bilinear interpolation before training pre-trained classifiers.
Dataset Image size Num. of Classes
Number of samples
Train Test
Caltech 224x224 256 23,703 6,904
CUBS 224X224 200 5994 5794
Diabetic5 224x224 5 85,108 21,278
GTSRB 32x32 / 224x224 43 39,209 12,630
CIFAR10 32x32 / 224x224 10 50,000 10,000
Training victim models. To obtain complex victim models, we fine-tune
weights of a pre-trained ResNet34 [6] model. We train 5 complex victim mod-
els using the datasets summarized in Table 1 and name these victim models
{Dataset name}-RN34. In training, we use SGD optimizer with an initial learn-
ing rate of 0.1 that is decreased by a factor of 10 every 60 epochs over 200
epochs.
Training surrogate models. To build surrogate models, we fine-tune weights
of a pre-trained ResNet34 [6] model. We query FV ’s prediction API with samples
from DA and obtain {DA, FV(DA)}. We train surrogate models using an SGD
4 https://github.com/gregwchase/dsi-capstone
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optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.01 that is decreased by a factor of 10
every 60 epochs over 100 epochs. We use the same model architecture for both FV
and FA in order to replicate the experiments in the original paper. Additionally,
we discuss the effect of model architecture mismatch in Section 5.1.
Experimental results. Table 2 presents the test accuracy of FV and FA in
our reproduction as well as experimental results reported in the original pa-
per (FV† , FA†). The attack effectiveness against Caltech-RN34 and CUBS-RN34
models is consistent with the corresponding values reported in [22]. We found
that FA against Diabetic5-RN34 does not recover the same degree of perfor-
mance. This inconsistency is a result of different transfer sets labeled by two
different FV ’s.
As shown in Table 2, Knockoff nets is effective against pre-trained complex
DNN models. Knockoff nets can imitate the functionality of FV via A’s transfer
set, even though DA is completely different from V’s training data. We will
discuss the effect of transfer set with more detail in Section 5.3.
Table 2. Test accuracy Acc(·) of FV , FA in our reproduction and FV† , FA† re-
ported by [22]. Good surrogate models are in bold based on their performance recovery
(Acc(FA)/Acc(FV)×).
FV Acc(FV) Acc(FA) Acc(FV†) Acc(FA†)
Caltech-RN34 74.6% 72.2% (0.97 ×) 78.8% 75.4% (0.96 ×)
CUBS-RN34 77.2% 70.9% (0.91 ×) 76.5% 68.0% (0.89 ×)
Diabetic5-RN34 71.1% 53.5% (0.75 ×) 58.1% 47.7% (0.82 ×)
GTSRB-RN34 98.1% 94.8% (0.97 ×) - -
CIFAR10-RN34 94.6% 88.2% (0.93 ×) - -
4 Detection of Knockoff Nets Attack
In this section, we present a method designed to detect queries used for Knock-
off nets. We analyze attack effectiveness w.r.t. the capacity of the model used
for detection and the overlap between A’s and V’s training data distributions.
Finally, we investigate attack effectiveness when A’s queries are detected and
additional countermeasures are taken.
4.1 Goals and Overview
DNNs are trained using datasets that come from a specific distribution D. Many
benchmark datasets display distinct characteristics that make them identifi-
able (e.g. cars in CIFAR10 vs ImageNet) as opposed to being representative
of real-world data [30]. A DNN trained using such data might be overcon-
fident, i.e. it gives wrong predictions with high confidence scores, when it is
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evaluated with samples drawn from a different distribution D′. Predictive un-
certainty is unavoidable when a DNN model is deployed for use via a predic-
tion API. In this case, estimating predictive uncertainty is crucial to reduce
over-confidence and provide better generalization for unseen samples. Several
methods were introduced [7,20,17] to measure the predictive uncertainty by de-
tecting out-of-distribution samples in the domain of image recognition. Base-
line [7] and ODIN [20] methods analyze the softmax probability distribution
of the DNN to identify out-of-distribution samples. A recent state-of-the-art-
method [17] detects out-of-distribution samples based on their Mahalanobis dis-
tance [2] to the closest class-conditional distribution. Although these methods
were tested against adversarial samples in evasion attacks, their detection per-
formance against Knockoff nets is unknown. What is more, their performance
heavily relies on the choice of threshold value which corresponds to the rate of
correctly identified in-distribution samples (TNR rate).
Our goal is to detect queries that do not correspond to the main classification
task of V’s model. In case of Knockoff nets, this translates to identifying inputs
that come from a different distribution than V’s training set. Queries containing
such images constitute the distinctive aspect of the adversary model in Knockoff
nets: 1) availability of large amount of unlabeled data 2) limited information
about the purpose of the API. To achieve this, we propose a binary classi-
fier based on the ResNet architecture. It differentiates inputs from and out of
V’s data distribution. Our binary classifier requires a labeled out-of-distribution
dataset for the training phase unlike other detection methods [7,20,17]. However,
binary classifiers have higher accuracy in the absence of adversary’s queries [1]
than one-class classifiers used in the prior work.
Our solution can be used as a filter placed in front of the prediction API.
4.2 Training Setup
Datasets. When evaluating our method, we consider all FV ’s we built before in
Section 3.2. To train our binary classifiers, we combine V’s training samples that
are used to build FV (in-distribution) and 90,000 randomly sampled images from
ImageNet (out-distribution), 90 images per class. To construct a test dataset,
we combine V’s corresponding test samples and another subset of ImageNet
containing 10,000 samples, 10 images per class. ImageNet serves the purpose of
a varied and easily available dataset that A could use. We assume that legitimate
clients query the prediction API with in-distribution test samples and A queries
it with 10,000 ImageNet samples. In order to measure the generalizability of
our detector, we also consider the case where A queries the prediction API with
20,000 samples from the OpenImages [16] dataset that does not overlap with
ImageNet. We use the same test datasets to measure the performance of other
state-of-the-art out-of-distribution detectors.
Training binary classifer. In our experiments, we examine two types of mod-
els: 1) ResNet models trained from scratch and 2) pre-trained ResNet models
with frozen weights where we replace the final layer with binary logistic regres-
sion. In this section, we refer to different ResNet models as RN followed by the
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number indicating the number of layers, e.g. RN34; we further use the LR suffix
to highlight pre-trained models with a logistic regression layer.
We assign label 0 to in-distribution samples (V’s dataset) and 1 to out-of-
distribution samples (90,000 ImageNet samples). All images are normalized ac-
cording to ImageNet-derived mean and standard deviation. We apply the same
labeling and normalization procedure to the A’s transfer sets (both 10,000 Ima-
geNet and 20,000 OpenImages samples). To train models from scratch (models
RN18 and RN34), we use the ADAM optimizer [12] with initial learning rate of
0.001 for the first 100 epochs and 0.0005 for the remaining 100 (200 total). Ad-
ditionally, we repeat the same training procedure while removing images whose
class labels overlap with ImageNet from V’s dataset (models RN18*, RN34*,
RN18*LR, RN34*LR, RN101*LR, RN152*LR). This will minimize the risk of
false positives and simulate the scenario with no overlap between the datasets.
To train models with the logistic regression layer (models RN18*LR, RN34*LR,
RN101*LR, RN152*LR), we take ResNet models pre-trained on ImageNet. We
replace the last layer with a logistic regression model and freeze the remain-
ing layers. We train logistic regression using the LBFGS solver [34] with L2
regularization and use 10-fold cross-validation to find the optimal value of the
regularization parameter.
4.3 Experimental Results
We divide our experiments into two phases. In the first phase, we select CUBS
and train binary classifiers with different architectures in order to identify the
optimal classifier. We assess the results using the rate of correctly detected in-
(true negative rate, TNR) and out-of-distribution samples (true positive rate,
TPR). In the second phase, we evaluate the performance of the selected optimal
architecture using all datasets in Section 3.2 and assess it based on the achieved
TPR and TNR.
Table 3. Distinguishing A’s ImageNet transfer set (TPR) from in-distribution sam-
ples corresponding to CUBS test set (TNR). Results are reported for models trained
from scratch (RN18, RN34), trained from scratch excluding overlapping classes (mod-
els RN18*, RN34*) and using pre-trained models with logistic regression (models
RN18*LR, RN34*LR, RN101*LR, RN152*LR. Best results are in bold.
Model
RN18 RN34 RN18* RN34*
TPR/TNR 86% / 83% 94% / 80% 90% / 83% 95% / 82%
Model
RN18*LR RN34*LR RN101*LR RN152*LR
TPR/TNR 84% / 84% 93% / 89% 93% / 93% 93% / 93%
As presented in the Table 3, we find that the optimal architecture is RN101*LR:
pre-trained ResNet101 model with logistic regression replacing the final layer.
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Table 4. Distinguishing in-distribution test samples from A’s transfer set as out-of-
distribution samples. Comparison of our method with Baseline [7], ODIN [20] and
Mahalanobis [17] w.r.t TPR (correctly detected out-of-distribution samples) and TNR
(correctly detected in-distribution samples). Best results are in bold.
A’s In-dist. Ours Baseline / ODIN / Mahalanobis
transfer set dataset TPR TNR TPR (at TNR Ours) TPR (at TNR 95%)
ImageNet
Caltech 63% 56% 87% / 88% / 59% 13% / 11% / 5%
CUBS 93% 93% 48% / 54% / 19% 39% / 43% / 12%
Diabetic5 99% 99% 1% / 25% / 98% 5% / 49% / 99%
GTSRB 99% 99% 42% / 56% / 71% 77% / 94% / 89%
CIFAR10 96% 96% 28% / 54% / 89% 33% / 60% / 91%
OpenImages
Caltech 61% 59% 83% / 83% / 6% 11% / 11% / 6%
CUBS 93% 93% 47% / 50% / 14% 37% / 44% / 14%
Diabetic5 99% 99% 1% / 21% / 99% 4% / 44% / 99%
GTSRB 99% 99% 44% / 64% / 75% 76% / 93% / 87%
CIFAR10 96% 96% 27% / 56% / 92% 33% / 62% / 95%
Table 3 also shows that increasing model capacity improves detection accuracy.
For the remaining experiments we use RN101*LR since it achieves the same
TPR and TNR as RN152*LR while being faster in inference.
Prior work [33,14] has shown that pre-trained DNN features transfer better
when tasks are similar. In our case, half of task is identical to the pre-trained task
(recognizing ImageNet images). Thus it might be ideal to avoid modifying net-
work parameters and keep pre-trained model parameters frozen by replacing the
last layer with a logistic regression. Another benefit of using logistic regression
over complete fine-tuning is that pre-trained embeddings can be pre-calculated
once at a negligible cost, after which training can proceed without performance
penalties on CPU in a matter or minutes. Thus, model owners can cheaply train
an effective model extraction defense. Such a defense can have wide applicability
for small-scale and medium-scale model owners. Finally, since our defense mech-
anism is stateless, it does not depend on prior queries made by the adversary
nor does it keep other state. It handles each query in isolation; therefore, it can
not be circumvented by sybil attacks.
Maintaining high TNR is important for usability reasons. Table 4 showcases
results for all datasets. We compare our approach with existing state-of-the-art
methods detecting out-of-distribution samples 5 when they are also deployed to
identify A’s queries. We report results for these methods with optimal hyper-
parameters (c.f. Table 4). Note that other methods are threshold-based detectors,
they require setting TNR to a value before detecting A’s queries. Our method
achieves high TPR (> 90%) on all V’s but Caltech-RN34 and very high (> 99%)
for GTSRB-RN34 and Diabetic5-RN34. Furthermore, our method outperforms
other state-of-the-art approaches when detecting A’s queries. These results are
consistent considering the overlap between V’s training dataset and our subsets
of ImageNet and OpenImages (A’s transfer set). GTSRB and Diabetic5 have no
5 https://github.com/pokaxpoka/deep Mahalanobis detector
10 Buse G. Atli et al.
overlap with ImageNet or OpenImages. On the other hand, CUBS, CIFAR10 and
Caltech contain images that represent either the same classes or families of classes
(as in CIFAR10) as ImageNet and OpenImages. This phenomena is particularly
pronounced in case of Caltech which has strong similarities to ImageNet and
OpenImages. While TPR remains significantly above the random 50%, such a
model is not suitable for deployment. Although other methods can achieve higher
TPR on Caltech (87-88%), we measured this value with TNR fixed at 56%. All
models fail to discriminate Caltech samples from A’s queries when constrained to
have a more reasonable TNR 95%. We find that our defense method works better
with prediction APIs that have specific tasks (such as traffic sign recognition),
as opposed to general purpose classifiers that can classify thousands of fine-
grained classes. We will discuss how a more realistic A can evade these detection
mechanisms in Section 5.4.
5 Revisiting the Adversary Model
We aim to identify capabilities and limitations of Knockoff nets under different
experimental setups with more realistic assumptions. We evaluate Knockoff nets
when 1) FA ad FV have completely different architectures, 2) the granularity
of FV ’s prediction API output changes, and 3) A can access data closer to V’s
training data distribution. We also discuss DA’s effect on the surrogate model
performance.
5.1 Victim Model Architecture
We measure the performance of Knockoff nets when FV does not use pre-trained
DNN model but is trained from scratch with a completely different architecture
for its task. We apply 5-layer GTSRB-5L and 9-layer CIFAR10-9L FV ’s as de-
scribed in previous model extraction work [9]. These models are trained using
Adam optimizer with learning rate of 0.001 that is decreased to 0.0005 after 100
epochs over 200 epochs. The training procedure of surrogate models is the same
as in Section 3.2. Thus, GTSRB-5L and CIFAR10-9L have different architec-
tures and optimization algorithms than those used by A. As shown in Table 5,
Knockoff nets performs well when both FV and FA use pre-trained models even
if A uses a different pre-trained model architecture (VGG16 [26]). However, the
attack effectiveness decreases when FV is specifically designed for the given task
and does not base its performance on any pre-trained model.
5.2 Granularity of Prediction API Output
If FV ’s prediction API gives only the predicted class or truncated results, such as
top-k predictions or rounded version of the full probability vector for each query,
performance of the surrogate model degrades. Table 6 shows this limitation,
where the prediction API gives complete probability vector to Ap and only
predicted class to Ac. Table 6 also demonstrates that the amount of degradation
Extraction of Complex DNN Models: Real Threat or Boogeyman? 11
Table 5. Test accuracy Acc(·) of FV , FAR and FAV and the performance recovery
of surrogate models. AR uses ResNet34 and AV uses VGG16 for surrogate model
architecture.
FV Acc(FV) Acc(FAR) Acc(FAV )
GTSRB-RN34 98.1% 94.8% (0.97 ×) 90.1 (0.92 ×)
GTSRB-5L 91.5% 54.5% (0.59 ×) 56.2 (0.61 ×)
CIFAR10-RN34 94.6% 88.2% (0.93 ×) 82.9 (0.87 ×)
CIFAR10-9L 84.5% 61.4% (0.73 ×) 64.7 (0.76 ×)
is related to the number of classes in FV , since A obtains comparatively less
information if the actual number of classes is high and the granularity of response
is low. For example, the degradation is severe when Knockoff nets is implemented
against Caltech-RN34 and CUBS-RN34 having more than or equal to 200 classes.
However, degradation is low or zero when Knockoff nets is implemented against
other models (Diabetic5-RN34, GTSRB-RN34, CIFAR10-RN34).
Table 6. Test accuracy Acc(·) of FV , FAp , FAc and the performance recovery of sur-
rogate models. Ap receives complete probability vector and Ac only receives predicted
class from the prediction API.
FV Acc(FV) Acc(FAp) Acc(FAc)
Caltech-RN34 (256 classes) 74.6% 68.5% (0.92 ×) 41.9% (0.56 ×)
CUBS-RN34 (200 classes) 77.2% 54.8% (0.71 ×) 18.0% (0.23 ×)
Diabetic5-RN34 (5 classes) 71.1% 59.3% (0.83 ×) 54.7% (0.77 ×)
GTSRB-RN34 (43 classes) 98.1% 92.4% (0.94 ×) 91.6% (0.93 ×)
CIFAR10-RN34 (10 classes) 94.6% 71.1% (0.75 ×) 53.6% (0.57 ×)
Many commercial prediction APIs return top-k outputs for queries (Clarifai
returns top-10 outputs and Google Cloud Vision returns up to top-20 outputs
from more than 10000 labels). Therefore, attack effectiveness will likely degrade
when it is implemented against such real-world prediction APIs.
5.3 Transfer Set Construction
When constructing {DA, FV(DA)}, A might collect images that are irrelevant
to the learning task or not close to V’s training data distribution. Moreover, A
might end up having an imbalanced set, where observations for each class are
disproportionate. In this case, per-class accuracy of FA might be much lower
than FV for classes with a few observations. Figure 1 shows this phenomenon
when FV is CIFAR10-RN34. For example, Acc(FA) is much lower than Acc(FV)
in “deer” and “horse” classes. When the histogram of {DA, FV(DA)} is checked,
the number of queries resulting in these prediction classes are low when compared
with other classes. We conjecture that a realistic A might try to balance the
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Class name Acc(FV) Acc(FA)
Airplane 95% 88% (0.92 ×)
Automobile 97% 95% (0.97 ×)
Bird 92% 87% (0.94 ×)
Cat 89% 86% (0.96 ×)
Deer 95% 84% (0.88 ×)
Dog 88% 84% (0.95 ×)
Frog 97% 90% (0.92 ×)
Horse 96% 79% (0.82 ×)
Ship 96% 92% (0.95 ×)
Truck 96% 92% (0.95 ×)
Fig. 1. Histogram of A’s transfer set constructed by querying CIFAR10-RN34 vic-
tim model with 100,000 ImageNet samples and per-class test accuracy for victim and
surrogate models. The largest differences in per-class accuracies are in bold.
transfer set by adding more observations for underrepresented classes or remove
some training samples with less confidence values.
We further investigate the effect of a poorly chosen DA by performing Knock-
off nets against all FV ’s using Diabetic5 as DA (aside from Diabetic5-RN34). We
measure Acc(FA) to be between 3.9-41.9%. The performance degradation in this
experiment supports our argument that the DA should be chosen carefully by
A.
5.4 Access to In-distribution Data
A realistic Amight know the task of the prediction API and could collect natural
samples related to this task. By doing so, A can improve its surrogate model by
constructing {DA, FV(DA)} that approximates FV well without being detected.
In section 4, we observed that the higher the similarity between A’s and V’s
training data distribution, the less effective our method becomes. In the worst
case, A has access to a large amount of unlabeled data that does not significantly
deviate from V’s training data distribution. In such a scenario, TNR values in
Table 4 would clearly drop to 50%. We argue that this limitation is inherent to
all detection methods that try to identify out-of-distribution samples.
Publicly available datasets designed for ML research as well as vast databases
accessible through search engines and from data vendors (e.g. Quandl, DataSift,
Axciom) allow A to obtain substantial amount of unlabeled data from any do-
main. Therefore, making assumptions about A’s access to natural data (or lack
of thereof) is not realistic. This corresponds to the most capable, and yet plau-
sible, adversary model - one in which A has approximate knowledge about V’s
training data distribution and access to a large, unlabeled dataset. In such a
scenario, A’s queries are not going to differ from a benign client, rendering de-
tection techniques ineffective. Therefore we conclude that against a strong, but
realistic adversary, the current business model of prediction APIs, which allow
a large number of inexpensive queries cannot thwart model extraction attacks.
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Even if model extraction attacks can be detected through stateful analysis,
highly distributed Sybil attacks are unlikely to be detected. In theory, vendors
could charge their customers upfront for a significant number of queries (over
100k), making Sybil attacks cost-ineffective. However, this reduces utility for
benign users and restricts the access only to those who can afford to pay. Using
authentication for customers or rate-limiting techniques also reduce utility for
benign users. Using these methods only slow down the attack and ultimately fail
to prevent model extraction attacks.
6 Related Work
There have been several methods proposed to detect or deter model extrac-
tion attacks. In certain cases, altering predictions returned to API clients has
been shown to significantly deteriorate model extraction attacks: predictions can
be restricted to classes [31,23] or adversarially modified to degrade the perfor-
mance of the surrogate model [18,23]. However, it has been shown that such
defenses does not work against all attacks. Model extraction attacks against
simple DNNs [9,23,22] are still effective when using only the predicted class.
While these defenses may increase the training time of A, they ultimately do
not prevent Knockoff nets.
Other works have argued that model extraction defenses alone are not suffi-
cient and additional countermeasures are necessary. In DAWN [28], the authors
propose that the victim can poison A’s training process by occasionally return-
ing false predictions, and thus embed a watermark in its model. If A later makes
the surrogate model publicly available for queries, victim can claim ownership
using the embedded watermark. DAWN is effective at watermarking surrogate
models obtained using Knockoff nets, but requires that A’s model is publicly
available for queries and does not protect from the model extraction itself. How-
ever, returning false predictions with the purpose of embedding watermarks may
be unacceptable in certain deployments, e.g. malware detection. Therefore, ac-
curate detection of model extraction may be seen as a necessary condition for
watermarking.
Prior work found that distances between queries made during model extrac-
tion attacks follow a different distribution than the legitimate ones [9]. Thus, at-
tacks could be detected using density estimation methods, where A’s inputs pro-
duce a highly skewed distribution. This technique protects DNN models against
specific attacks using synthetic queries and does not generalize to other attacks,
e.g. Knockoff nets. Other methods are designed to detect queries that explore
abnormally large region of the input space [11] or attempt to identify queries
that get increasingly close to the classes’ decision boundaries [25]. However, these
techniques are limited in application to decision trees and they are ineffective
against complex DNNs that are targeted by Knockoff nets.
In this work, we aim to detect queries that significantly deviate from the
distribution of victim’s dataset without affecting prediction API’s performance.
As such, our approach is closest to the PRADA [9] defense. However, we aim to
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detect Knockoff nets, which PRADA is not designed for. Our defense exploits
the fact that Knockoff nets uses natural images sampled from public databases
constructed for a general task. Our defense presents an inexpensive, yet effec-
tive defense against Knockoff nets, and may have wide practical applicability.
However, we believe that ML-based detection schemes open up the possibility
of evasion, which we aim to investigate in future work.
7 Conclusion
We evaluated the effectiveness of Knockoff nets, a state-of-the-art model ex-
traction attack, in several real-life scenarios. We showed that under its original
adversary model described in [22], it is possible to detect an adversary A mount-
ing Knockoff nets attacks by distinguishing between in- and out-of-distribution
queries. While we confirm the results reported in [22], we also showed that more
realistic assumptions about the capabilities of A can have both positive and
negative implications for attack effectiveness. On the one hand, the performance
of Knockoff nets is reduced against more realistic prediction APIs that do not
return complete probability vector. On the other hand, if A knows the task
of the victim model and has access to sufficient unlabeled data drawn from
the same distribution as the V’s training data, it can not only be very effec-
tive, but virtually undetectable. We therefore conclude that strong, but realistic
adversary can extract complex real-life DNN models effectively, without being
detected. Given this conclusion, we believe that deterrence techniques like wa-
termarking [28] and fingerprinting [21] deserve further study – while they cannot
prevent model extraction, they can reduce the incentive for model extraction by
rendering large-scale exploitation of extracted models detectable.
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